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       Where the causes of the Asian financial crises are concerned, we believe that a 
structural accumulation oftrade -deficits is a more fundamental cause than a failure of 
financial controls. Among Asian countries that are targets of international rbitrage, 
chronic trade deficits have led to a shortage of foreign currency reserves, making it 
impossible for such countries to prop up their own currency through buying. 
      Thus, forecasting future movements in these structural trade deficits has 
relevance to forecasting the course of the currently depressed exchange rates. 
Predicted results produced by the "Kyoto University Pacific Rim Economic Model" 
maintained by the authors reveal an overall stabilization and moderate improvement i  
the real exchange rates of 10 Asia Pacific countries. 
      Using the same model, we investigated the effect of capital flight on individual 
Asian countries, based on a theory that a rise in productivity in the U.S. attracts capital, 
which has a negative ffect on several other countries. Results indicated that the 
ASEAN country crises will not continue in the long run, and that the crisis in South 
Korea should be seen as the origin of an overall decline in the rate of growth.(JEL C53, 
F01, F17, F21) F31, F32, 053)
I. FOREIGN TRADE BALANCES AND EXCHANGE RATES
      The principal factors held up as the causes of the Asian monetary crises are (1) 
the "bubble" economy, its excessive reliance on short-term capital, and other failures in 
financial control, and (2) readjustment of exchange rates intended to bring about 
balanced foreign trade. The authors believe that he first set of factors is no more than a 
proximal cause, while the second set is fundamental. The reasoning here is that even if 
financial controls were largely in place, trade deficits could not persist in the long run, 
and exchange rates would ultimately have to be adjusted. The argument also stems 
from the realization that among targets of international rbitrage, chronic trade deficits 
have led to a shortage of foreign currency reserves, making it impossible for such 
countries to prop up their own currency through buying. This reasoning would indicate 
that long-term trade deficits are the basic cause of the recent currency falls. 
      It is also true that Taiwan and other trade-surplus countries have felt the effects
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of the recent urmoil, albeit slightly, but rather than ascribing these to country-specific 
causes, we suggest that the pervasive currency falls in other Asian countries may be due 
to a predicted negative ffect operating through capital movements and trade. This 
explanation would also account for the relatively unscathed transition through the crisis 
in such cases. The depth of the Indonesian crisis results from a miscalculated political 
response. 
      Even if such trade deficits are indeed a fundamental cause of the crises, we 
believe that if currencies were not pegged to the dollar and slow, orderly currency falls 
resulted, pervasive crisis conditions like those of the present would not have developed. 
The significance of this is that while the present "governmental f ilures" deriving from 
the dollar peg system are an important lesson for the future, the suggestion that a 
fundamental cause of the currency falls does not lies.within the dollar peg system itself 
must be corroborated now. 
      Stated in reverse, previously overvalued Asian currencies were a fundamental 
cause of trade deficits, and the present currency adjustments have brought about a 
contrary improvement in trade balances. In reality, a reduction in imports after the 
currency crisis gave Thailand its first current account surplus in 14 years, in October, 
1997. Malaysia in 1997 also recorded its first trade surplus in 4 years, and South Korea 
shifted to a surplus position as of the end of 1997. The margin of surplus increased 
even in Indonesia. A consequent recovery in the exchange rates of these countries' 
currencies has already been seen except for rupia. This is same as prior currency crises 
in the world (see IMF(1998)). Of course, the background of contractionary fiscal 
policy and other efforts in each country cannot be ignored. 
      Figure 1 below is a graph of Asian currency movements over several years. As 
the figure shows, China undertook an initial currency devaluation at the beginning of 
1994, and the yen declined beginning roughly in the summer of 1995. Following a long 
period of high values of Asian currencies versus the yen and the Chinese yuan (which 
engendered long-term trade deficits), we see the current fall in these currencies. As 
shown, adjustment ofthe Asian currencies versus other principal currencies i extremely 
slow. In other words, adjustment of trade balances to exchange rates is rapid, while 
adjustment of exchange rates to trade balances is incomplete. Even though this 
divergence from underlying fundamentals is central to the crises, the essence of the 
situation remains that the crises have served as a means to adjust his divergence to such 
fundamentals.
II. TRADE BALANCES AND LONG-TERM EXCHANGE RATE PREDICTION
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      What we first must ascertain iswhether it was inevitable that these necessary 
currency adjustments occurred precipitously. In other words, even if a currency fall 
itself was inevitable, it was difficult to predict when the currency would fall. We 
therefore begin with a quantitative analysis addressing the issue at a level excluding the 
question of when a currency fall will occur; essentially, a level merely inquiring whether 
or not a decline is present as a trend. To this end, this report uses the international 
linkage model that we have recently developed, the "Kyoto University Pacific Rim 
Economic Model (KYPAC-5.3)." 
      Since space does not permit a detailed escription ofthe model here, details are 
left to Ohnishi (1998a, 1998b) and the Kyoto University Pacific Rim Database 
(http://pacific.kyoto-u.ac.jp/), and only the following characteristics of the model are 
described here in brief. 
(1) The primary objective of the model is to track long-term changes. So, GDP is 
  determined not by demand side but by supply side. 
(2) Multi-country linkages for each country model depend primarily on capital balance 
  functions. Here, capital balance is a function of the ratios to other countries' profit 
  rate = marginal productivity of capital. 
(3) The 10 economies of the U.S., Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
  Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, nd Australia make up the studied region. 
      The model is also characterized bya deport of exogenous variables, excluding 7 
dummy variables, but the foregoing 3 characteristics are the important ones in the 
context of this paper. The first among these 3 characteristics s expressed graphically in
the following Figure 2. In the figure, the segments connected by the (A) symbol 
represent the actual history, and those connected by the (x) symbol represent the history 
as explained by the model. Though smooth fluctuations like those of the capital-labor 
ratio (the most important variable in the model) are tracked relatively well in interim 
periods, only the overall trend is tracked successfully for widely fluctuating variables 
such as the trade balance/GDP ratio; however, this is not unsatisfactory for revealing 
long-term ovements. The significance of this is that while the model cannot rack 
rapid movements like those occurring at present, itcan still predict long-term ovements. 
It is important to know whether the current crises are transient or likely to persist 
indefinitely, and the relevant results of long-term predictions made out to 2025 using the 
model are shown in Tables 1 through 3. 
      Table 1 shows real exchange rate predictions determined by the model 
endogenously for the 10-country Asia-Pacific region. Here, "real exchange rates" are 
3
calculated by assuming identical inflation rates in each country. The end to the decline 
and the modest recovery of exchange rates that we have seen for individual Asian 
countries appear to be well predicted, though the current severe fall in the Indonesian 
currency isnot. These calculated results. were produced at the end of 1997. For Japan, 
the yen is predicted to rise slightly, a. result based on the trade-related prediction of a 
continuing trade surplus. 
      Table 2 shows GDP predictions on a "real dollar" base, where "real dollar" 
indicates adjustment tothe U.S. rate of inflation. The first striking result is that growth 
rates in the period of 1995-2000 in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea are 
negative, even if those in the period of 1995-1997 are high. However, growth rates 
recover thereafter. The implication is that the current crises are best perceived as a 
fundamentally short-term shock. Among these four countries though, however, the 
South Korean recovery is weak and can be taken as the origin of a long-term process of a 
decline in the rate of growth. In this table forecasting essentially lower growth rates the 
more developed the country, and higher growth rates the less developed the country, this 
result can be understood as a process of growth rate decline in a South Korea that 
represents a quasi-developed country. 
      Table 3 displays predicted results for foreign trade, which are intimately related 
to exchange rate predictions in our model. This table indicates a shrinkage of relative 
trade deficits in Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines, all of which suffered 
currency falls (same prediction was made by Komine(1998)). However, unprecedented 
deficits are indicated for Indonesia nd Malaysia, where reductions inpetroleum exports 
are foreseen, and a low level of confidence r garding this fact may be connected totheir 
present crises. 
      In sum, the current crises do not appear to be fundamental or long-term, with 
some exceptions. They are correctly viewed as an adjustment of exchange rates 
divergent from the "fundamentals", and they should not be seized upon as evidence of 
essential weakness in the Asian economies ( see Sachs(1997) and Radelet & 
Sachs(1997)) .
III. CAPITAL FLIGHT-RELATED SIMULATION
      While the foregoing explanation shows that the current "crises" are basically not 
irreversible in Asian developing countries, the model also allows one other extremely 
interesting simulation. Results are shown in Table 4, and these indicate how a 
macroeconomic increase in productivity in the countries in the left column would affect
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total production in the countries in the top row. For each of the 10 countries, Table 4 
indicates the +/- direction of the effect of such increased productivity, and among these, 
note should be taken of the effect on other countries of the U.S., in the top row. 
      Specifically, a negative effect is indicated for every country other than Japan, 
meaning that increased productivity in the U.S. raises its profit, which attracts a flow of 
capital to the U.S. Recent economic conditions in the U.S. are naturally interpreted as 
"increased productivity" in some sense
, and this evokes a causal relationship in which 
such increased productivity triggered the crises in Thailand and South Korea, beginning a 
capital outflow. Multi-country econometric models allowing a direct simulation of such 
international capital movements in Asian developing countries are extremely limited. 
Apart from the model of the authors, there is only that of Takenaka, et al. (1986), but 
this model is extremely old, leaving only the model of the authors. This is the reason for 
carrying out such a simulation here. 
      In addition to a simple +/- indication of U. S.-induced effects on the GDPs of 
the 9 other countries, more interesting results describing the extent and course of the 
effects can also be obtained. Results are shown in Figure 3 and indicate the effect of a 
US $100 billion (1995 value) increase in productivity inthe U.S. in 1994. 
      A close examination f these results reveals the very interesting fact that in the 
initial period, the negative ffects are greatest on South Korea and Thailand. This is 
because the capital outflow phenomenon at the start of the crisis was the most 
pronounced in these two countries. Also of great interest is the fact that while an 
initially large negative ffect on China later shifts to a positive ffect, an initially small 
negative effect on Australia subsequently grows. This would seem to reflect 
fundamental differences in growth potential in these two countries. 
      One other interesting fact in a comparison of these event patterns i  that the 
negative ffect on Thailand and the negative ffect on Taiwan are opposites in terms of 
early versus late periods. This indicates that recovery is more rapid in Thailand, or 
perhaps that he fundamental growth potential in Taiwan is weaker than Thailand. It is 
also possible that the Thai crisis is affected by deficiencies inpolicy and is not helped in 
this respect, but it is in any event interesting that after the fifth year in the figure, the 
largest negative ffects are seen in the developed and semi-developed countries of 
Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan. Current global conditions of overall 
"convergence" illustrate that growth rates are essentially lower the more developed the 
country, and the results may also reflect such latent growth rate levels. 
      In sum, it has been shown that he ASEAN country crises will not continue for 
an extended period, that the South Korean crisis should be seen as part of an overall
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process of growth rate decline, and that the capital flight inciting these crises may be 
related to a temporary increase in productivity in the U.S.
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1 Projected Real Exchange Rates through 2025 
(each currency/ dollar) (average rowth rates before 5 years ago in parenthesis)

























































 1053 1029 
(-0.6) (-0.5) 
 8.28 7.91 
(-0.3) (-0.9) 
 32.5 32.7 
(0.3) (0.1) 
 31.5 31.2 '(-0 .2) (-0.2) 
 36.3 35.8 
(-0.5) (-0.4) 
 3.26 3.24 
(-0.2) (-0.1) 
 3493 3534 
 (0.3) (0.2) 






 7.41 6.87 
(-1.3) (-1.5) 
 33.0 33.5 
(0.2) (0.1) 








 1.17 1.17 
(0.0), (0.0)
Table 2 Projected GDP (billion dollar, at constant prices in 
        (average growth rates before 5 years ago in parenthesis)
1995)
YEAR 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025












































































































































Table 3 Projected Ratios of Balance of Trade to GDP (%)
YEAR 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
   U.S.A. -2.2 
  JAPAN 2.3 
  KOREA -2.3 
  CHINA 2.8 
 TAIWAN 3.2 
PHILIPPINES -14.7 
 THAILAND -10.3 
 MALAYSIA - 4.9 
INDONESIA 2.4 
AUSTRALIA -1.2
 -1 .5 
   1.9 
 -2 .1 
   3.1 
   2.3 
-11 .6 
 -7 .5 
 -5 .2 
   1.6 
 -0 .2
-1 .1 
  1.8 
-1 .6 
  3.9 




  1.0 
-0 .4
-1 .3 
  1.7 
-0 .8 
  4.4 




  0.4 
-0 .4
-1 .7 
  1.6 
-0 .7 
  4.7 






  1.5 
-0 .7 
  4.8 






  1.1 
  1.4 
-0 .8 
  4.9 
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